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a wave of new studies and concepts has considerably advanced our understanding of the con-
under which individuals are selected to help others. On the empirical side, advances are due
nger incorporation of the natural history of each study species and an emphasis on proximate
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ways, the revolutionary new approach to studying behaviour which is currently underway.Keywords: cooperation; game theory; helping; deception; cheating; cognitionNature is full of struggle, as predicted by the theory of
evolution through natural selection, yet there are also
paramount examples where individuals help each
other. These instances of helping have been difficult
to reconcile with Darwin’s theory because it is not
always obvious how individuals are working for their
own direct benefit. Consequently, initial publications
that offered solutions to subsets of the observed
cases of helping, such as kin selection (Hamilton
1964) or reciprocity (Trivers 1971; Axelrod &
Hamilton 1981), are among the most influential and
most cited papers in evolution/behavioural ecology.
Despite these initial successes, models are often
difficult to map onto actions, and empirical evidence
for many proposed solutions is quite sparse. However,
during the last few years, a wave of new studies and
concepts has considerably advanced our understand-
ing of the conditions under which individuals are
selected to help others. We therefore think it is
timely to bring together the state of the art concerning
our knowledge of helping. Perhaps more importantly,
reviewing our current knowledge should help us to
identify the many gaps that still exist in our under-
standing of helping behaviour.
Of critical concern is that a large part of the existing
theory is relatively poorly matched with empiricalfor correspondence (sbrosnan@gsu.edu).
ntribution of 14 to a Theme Issue ‘Cooperation and
n: from evolution to mechanisms’.research. There may be several reasons for this mis-
match. For example, theorists are often interested in
human behaviour and the various forms of reciprocity
that may lead to stable cooperation. As a consequence,
very detailed models exist for these kinds of concepts.
However, relatively few examples of cooperation and
mutualism in other species seem to fit reciprocity con-
cepts, as several contributors to this volume point out
(Brosnan et al. 2010; Connor 2010; Leimar &
Hammerstein 2010; Melis & Semmann 2010).
Alternative concepts exist (Connor 2010; Leimar &
Hammerstein 2010), but these seem to attract little
attention from theorists. Another reason for the mis-
match is that both ecological models and game
theoretical models yield straightforward and seemingly
simple cooperative solutions like ‘always help’ or ‘start
cooperatively and then match your partner’s behaviour
in subsequent rounds’, e.g. Tit for Tat; Axelrod &
Hamilton (1981). Despite their simplicity and
elegance, which lend a seductive allure, such predic-
tions rarely fit real-life observations, where
individuals do not seem to make decisions as precisely
as predicted (de Waal & Suchak 2010) and where
strong variation in behaviour is often observed within
individuals, between individuals and between species
(Soares et al. 2010). In fact, the effort to explain
such variation has led to a major new field in behav-
ioural ecology, named ‘animal personality’ (Gosling
2001; Sih et al. 2004; Bergmu¨ller et al. 2010). Identi-
fying ultimate and proximate sources of variation
may help theorists to refine their models and hence
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2make them more realistic (McNamara & Leim
2010).
Overall, we feel that much important theory
already out there, but that more empirical studi
are needed to help to identify the most importa
concepts. For example, predictions about how dem
ography, life history and ecology affect the evolutio
and maintenance of helping are well establishe
(Lehmann & Rousset 2010); what is lacking is empir
cal support. Thus, there is a clear need for caref
descriptions of the natural history of species as
basis for well informed, and hence well designe
experiments. Such experiments should test not on
the evolutionary theory, but also the mechanism
(cognitive, physiological, etc.) underlying cooperati
behaviour. A detailed understanding of the mec
anisms will provide key information for a ne
generation of more nuanced models. Mechanisms a
important to specify trade-offs and constraints. F
example, in most models there are a variety of typic
assumptions, such as the assumptions that individua
have perfect memory, that gaining information
cost free, or that each individual is able to perfor
all different behavioural options investigated. The
assumptions are unlikely to be realistic for any empi
cal example, and the conclusions that emerge fro
more realistic assumptions change the predictions
the models (McNamara & Leimar 2010).
Understanding the costs of information and ass
ciated trade-offs and constraints are particular
important for a full appreciation of how cooperatin
and avoiding cooperation (cheating) are—or a
not—linked to the evolution of cognition and hen
brain structure and brain size (Brosnan et al. 2010
Cooperating and cheating are closely intertwine
and it is unlikely that one can be understood in th
absence of the other. This view emerges repeated
in the contributions to this volume. Similarly, on
can ask under which conditions stable cooperation
best achieved through ‘positive’ mechanisms th
reward cooperative behaviour, versus when ‘negativ
mechanisms that handle non-cooperative partne
through sanctioning, punishing or abandoning the
may be the best option to promote helping. Negati
mechanisms may easily promote cooperative behavio
by one partner but the outcome is not necessar
beneficial for all interacting individuals. Distinguishin
sanctions and punishment of cheaters from coercio
and parasitism remains a challenging topic f
empiricists (Jensen 2010).
When we planned the content of this volume, o
goal was to make sure that the general opinio
voiced above were reflected in the contribution
Purely theoretical papers are in the minority; instea
the emphasis was placed on empirical but neverthele
conceptual papers. More specifically, we felt that th
major theoretical debates on group selection/cultur
group selection versus inclusive fitness theory a
well covered elsewhere, and that these positions a
already clearly defined. We therefore avoid this top
in our volume, and focus on the ecological and gam
theoretical approaches instead. Lehmann & Rouss
(2010) demonstrate how demography, life histo
and ecology may promote or hinder the evolutionhelping by natural selection without explicitly di
tinguishing between direct and indirect fitne
benefits or within-group and between-group comp
tition. Similarly, de Waal & Suchak (2010) an
Jaeggi et al. (2010) discuss helping (other-regardin
behaviour in other cooperative species, includin
cooperatively breeding species, without trying to sp
natural selection into these subunits. Thinking holis
cally in terms of natural selection may be one w
around the theoretical discussions. Nevertheless, bio
ogists have been trained in the inclusive fitne
framework, and the relative importance of indire
versus direct fitness benefits (altruism vers
cooperation) has been a key topic for empiricis
The realization that relatedness per se does not allo
the conclusion that helping is due to an increase
indirect fitness (West et al. 2002; Lehmann & Rouss
2010) has led to an increased emphasis on dire
benefits in cooperatively breeding species like meerka
(Clutton-Brock 2002), and the development of vario
concepts that strongly resemble or extend establishe
game theoretic concepts of cooperation (Bergmu¨ll
et al. 2007). Measuring precisely the combined effec
of direct and indirect fitness benefits of helping will b
a major challenge for future studies. We refer inte
ested readers to another recently edited Philosophic
Transactions volume (Clutton-Brock et al. 200
where contributors explored how direct and indire
fitness benefits interact in the formation of societies
For the empirical chapters, we asked contributors
make their points using a broad taxonomic approa
whenever feasible. Helping is widespread in natur
ranging from plants to insects, and from bacteria
humans. Examples from all major taxonomic grou
exist, and comparing the evidence across a range
taxa may reveal important information about the gene
ality or specificity of many of the concepts that a
developed. Overall, we think that the various cont
butions provide major advances in understanding ho
cooperation, helping and deception actually manife
in nature and identify major future research areas wi
respect to four general issues. First, it is of paramou
importance to study in detail (and then incorporat
the natural history of one’s study species. Second, w
need to better integrate disciplines and research are
that currently focus on other topics into the study
cooperation. Third, we have to study mechanism
underlying behaviour and decision making. Final
we need to better understand the degree to whi
helping—and also cheating and deception—are linke
to the evolution of cognitive abilities, as well as t
degree to which human cooperation may differ fro
that of other species. For further discussions of sever
important aspects related to this question we al
refer interested readers to an edited Philosophic
Transactions volume by Emery et al. (2007).
Before we summarize the major topics in th
volume, we must deal briefly with terminolog
Given the plethora of definitions for cooperatio
altruism, and other terms in the field, confusion m
emerge simply because of the ways different autho
use the same terms, or use different terms for th
same behaviour. In an effort to provide a cohere
volume not only with respect to content but al
3with respect to terminology, we asked our contributors
to use our definitions for the most basic terms, derived
from an evolutionary approach as described in
Bshary & Bergmu¨ller (2008), and to specify how any
additional terms relate to these foundational defin-
itions. By linking all of our papers under a common
definitional framework, we provide readers a chance
to see how ideas tie together in a way that is not
possible when different definitions are used. The
definitions summarized below cannot cover all aspects
of helping, and authors were asked to provide defin-
itions for additional terms or extensions of our terms
in their chapters whenever necessary.
— Helping: this is the most general term and simply
implies that an individual on average increases the
fitness of a recipient. There are no assumptions
about the costs or benefits to the helper.
— Cooperative behaviour: a behaviour that on average
increases the fitness of a recipient and which is
under positive selection if it on average increases
the inclusive fitness of the actor via direct fitness
benefits.
— Altruistic behaviour: a behaviour that on average
increases the fitness of a recipient and which is
under positive selection if it on average increases
the inclusive fitness of the actor via indirect fitness
benefits. This has also been called ‘biological
altruism’. Some contributors distinguish this
‘ultimate altruism’ from what might be considered
‘proximate’ altruism, or, as it is often called,
psychological altruism, which is defined by its
underlying psychological mechanism, i.e. empathy.
Psychological altruism does not ask how helping
translates into fitness benefits.
— Cooperation: two (n) partners increase on average
their direct fitness due to the interaction.
— Cheating: a behaviour that increases the immediate
pay-off of the actor and reduces the immediate
pay-off of the recipient. Cheating thus differs
from deception, which implies a manipulation of
the partner. Deception and cheating do not necess-
arily co-occur (although they may do so).
— Spite: a behaviour which decreases the direct fitness
of both the actor and the recipient. Such behaviour
may evolve if it increases the inclusive fitness of the
actor via indirect fitness benefits. Similarly to
altruistic behaviour, there must be a careful
discrimination between ‘biological’ or ‘ultimate’
spite and ‘proximate’ spite. The latter is based on
the motivation to hurt someone else, without
asking the question how that may translate into
fitness benefits.
— Other-regarding behaviour: This term has recently
been used to describe helping behaviour, where
the motivation to help is based on empathy rather
than on calculations of how it might yield benefits
to the actor.
Note that we find it essential to distinguish between
individual behaviours and the outcome of interactions
when we talk about cooperation (again, see Bshary &
Bergmu¨ller (2008) for more detail). Similarly, it is
essential to distinguish ultimate function fromproximate mechanisms; in both cases, mixing up the
two can lead to misunderstandings. While we kept
the definitions short, it is worthwhile to point out
that West et al. (2007) included an important addition
to the definition of cooperative behaviour (‘mutual
benefits’ in their terminology), namely that the behav-
iour should in part be under selection because of its
positive effect on the recipient. With this addition
one can exclude cases like elephants defecating and
thereby providing by-product benefits to dung beetles
that would otherwise fit the definition of cooperation.
1. THE RESULTS OF THE VOLUME
(a) On the importance of knowing the natural
history of one’s study species
Only detailed knowledge about ecology and inter-
action patterns will allow informed guesses about the
game structure in which individuals are engaged
(n interactions, behavioural options, pay-off matrix,
etc.) and, hence, how helping may increase the
actors’ inclusive fitness. Demography, life history and
ecology will be particularly important to understand-
ing differences among species, but also among
populations (Lehmann & Rousset 2010). The various
game theoretic concepts presented primarily in
Leimar & Hammerstein (2010) and Connor (2010),
all implicitly make assumptions about the variables
discussed in Lehmann & Rousset (2010) in order to
construct pay-off matrices for the various behavioural
options considered. Most importantly, however,
models cannot make informed assumptions about
trade-offs or constraints if these are not identified by
empiricists. For example, the question whether inter-
actions take place in front of bystanders and whether
or not bystanders pay attention to these interactions
is foremost an empirical question (Earley 2010),
where the absence of any form of indirect reciprocity
might be due to cognitive constraints or trade-offs
between the benefits of acquiring information and
the costs. One possibility is that the benefits of infor-
mation collection will outweigh the costs only if
inter-individual variation is high (McNamara &
Leimar 2010).
A prime example of how ecology can be linked to
the evolution of helping and to the evolution of specific
mechanisms concerns reproductive systems. One
emerging hypothesis is that cooperative breeders are
more helpful than other, closely related, species due
to the unusual constraints, and resulting interdepen-
dency, of their breeding system (Jaeggi et al. 2010).
Under these circumstances, helping other group mem-
bers becomes more unconditional on the recipients’
behaviour than might otherwise be the case. Indeed,
one possibility which seems probable is that other-
regarding (prosocial) motivations evolved (de Waal &
Suchak 2010; Jaeggi et al. 2010) to provide a proxi-
mate mechanism that allows individuals to give away
resources unconditionally in situations in which it is
in their ultimate (if not immediate) benefit to do so.
(b) Integrating new disciplines into
the study of cooperation
Three papers introduce disciplines that we believe
are of major importance for an integrative
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4understanding of helping, but which currently foc
on other questions: animal personalities, behaviour
endocrinology, and communication network theor
The observation that individuals consistently diff
with respect to behaviour has attracted great intere
in the last several years (Gosling 2001; Sih et a
2004). The focus of research, however, has been o
the boldness—shyness axis and on aggression. Give
that inter-individual variation in behaviour may al
be a key factor promoting cooperation (McNamara
Leimar 2010), Bergmu¨ller et al. (2010) explore th
applicability of the concept of animal personalities
cooperation. One important prediction is that it
probable that cooperation emerges in context wi
other behaviours (behavioural syndromes), and th
that only a broad observational approach across co
texts will yield a complete explanation of th
variation between individual levels of cooperation.
The paper by Soares et al. (2010) explores th
potential role of hormones in explaining differenc
in levels of helping within individuals, between ind
viduals and between species, linking endocrinolo
to personality differences. Similarly to the field
animal personality, behavioural endocrinology h
had a major focus on aggression, but may bene
studies of cooperation. The paper also explains th
many potential pitfalls with respect to experiment
design and interpretation of results that one has
consider if one intends to manipulate hormon
levels. Empathy, pair bonding and other mechanism
that promote helping surely have an endocrinologic
component (e.g. the evidence for the effect of oxytoc
on both human and non-human social behaviou
Kosfeld et al. 2005; Lim & Young 2006).
Finally, research on communication networks h
rarely focused on cooperation (McGregor 2005
However, the fact that eavesdropping by bystande
in communication networks has been documented
a wide array of taxa, including invertebrates, makes
probable that image scoring and behaviour adjus
ments to being observed (‘audience effects’) may al
occur frequently in the context of cooperatio
Earley (2010) argues that the presence of bystande
may provide a strong selective force on decisions
cooperate, a force which is not currently considere
in an appropriate way.g
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).(c) The need to study mechanisms underlying
behaviour and decision making
We expect that the study of mechanisms underlyin
cooperative behaviour and decision-making process
in general are most likely to impact our understandin
of cooperation in nature, especially in dialogue wi
emerging theoretical models that take new eviden
into account. Mechanisms can be studied on man
different levels, be it ontogeny, physiology, endocri
ology, learning, cognition, processes in the brai
genetics, interactions between genes and environmen
etc. It is clear that we are on the cusp of major advanc
in understanding these mechanisms and their inte
actions. New ideas for proximate mechanisms, at t
level of both causation and ontogeny, are emergingexplain where cooperative behaviour does—and do
not—occur.
For instance, there has been a move away from th
idea of a calculated, precise model of reciprocal inves
ment towards one based on rules of thumb an
emotional valence (Brosnan et al. 2010; de Waal
Suchak 2010). This move opens the possibility
explaining cooperation in a wider variety of speci
and situations, and may provide explanations f
clearly cooperative interactions that nonetheless d
not meet traditional game theoretic rules (e.g. Tit f
Tat). Along with this, there is a greater interest
how individuals develop cooperative behaviour. Th
may emerge as a result of a genetically determine
strategy, a learned behavioural strategy (e.g. acquire
through associative learning), or higher cognitio
(Brosnan et al. 2010). Of course, many potenti
mechanisms may function at several of these leve
(e.g. empathy may be the result of genetic causatio
linked with learning during ontogeny).
Moreover, although there are some notab
exceptions, in many cases we know little about th
decision-making processes underlying cooperatio
In many cases this may overlap with behaviour
mechanisms; for instance, although it is often assume
that individuals make explicit calculations about the
decisions, there are remarkably few instances
which this has been documented. Instead, it seem
probable that individuals are following rules
thumb, including those based on emotional valen
and preferences for individuals (e.g. friendship
Brosnan et al. 2010). Moreover, it is often unknow
what information individuals are using to ma
decisions. They should be able to access their ow
state, but may also be able to incorpora
information from the environment or from other
outcomes (e.g. social comparison; Brosnan & d
Waal 2003). Understanding how individuals ma
decisions, and how they are affected by their physic
and social environments, will help us better predi
and understand when cooperation occurs and whe
it does not.(d) Linking cooperation, cheating and deceptio
to the evolution of cognitive abilities, and
implications for the ‘uniqueness’ of human
cooperation
A topic that is paramount in the current cooperatio
literature and will without doubt remain hot for qui
some time is the question of how human cooperatio
differs from that of other species (Melis & Semman
2010). Although there are a range of assumptio
(Fehr Fischbacher & Gachter 2002; de Waal 2005
the general consensus seems to be that we diff
from other species to some degree, but with clear ev
lutionary continuities. In some ways, we might stan
apart further in the realm of deception and spi
than cooperation (Jensen 2010). The cause of tho
differences is still a matter for debate.
One possibility that has been put forth
that humans have a tendency to help othe
(e.g. other-regarding preferences) which is beyond t
scope of other species (Silk et al. 2005; Jensen 2010
5On the other hand, evidence for these preferences has
been found in other species, leading to two hypotheses,
one more functional and the other more mechanistic
(and thus, not mutually exclusive). First, it is possible
that other-regarding preferences have evolved in
cooperatively breeding species because their unique
suite of life history characteristics leads to significant
interdependency and thus increased opportunities
for selection due to inclusive fitness (Jaeggi et al.
2010). Second, it may be that (one of) the proximate
mechanism behind such preferences is empathy, which
in at least some forms may be widespread in the
animal kingdom (de Waal & Suchak 2010).
Other possibilities focus on the differences in mag-
nitude or kind in other behaviours which in turn affect
cooperation. For instance, although many other
species show evidence of behavioural traditions, or cul-
tures (e.g. Emery et al. 2007; Fragaszy & Perry 2003;
Heyes & Galef 1996; Zentall & Galef 1988), human
culture seems to be of a greater magnitude. Since cul-
ture is known to affect cooperation, even in individuals
for whom basic criteria like age, level of education, etc.
are similar (Ga¨chter et al. 2010), humans may have an
advantage in structuring interactions, relationships
and institutions to favour cooperation. Humans also
possess language, allowing them to communicate
about other individuals more efficiently than other
species are able to do (although see Connor 2010,
for evidence in dolphins). This may lead to more effi-
cient communication networks in humans, and
increased opportunities for indirect learning, such as
through reputations, than is available for other species
(Earley 2010). For a more detailed discussion on the
evolution of societies, including humans, we refer the
reader to an edited volume by Clutton-Brock et al.
(2009). Finally, the very destructiveness of humans’
behaviour may lead to increased cooperation, if the
seeds of cooperation are sown through the hyper-
competitiveness and spite seen in human societies
(Jensen 2010).2. CONCLUSION
It is clear that we are at an exciting time in the study of
cooperation. After years of attempting to explain
cooperation using fairly basic, dyadic models assuming
static individuals (both developmentally within the
same individual and across different individuals), we
are beginning to understand the importance of vari-
ation at all levels in understanding cooperation. In
large part this is the result of a move away from a
reliance on the Prisoner’s Dilemma as the main con-
cept to explain cooperative behaviour (Leimar &
Hammerstein 2010), a concurrent acknowledgement
that cooperation may involve more than two individ-
uals (Connor 2010; Earley 2010), and, again, an
increased recognition of the importance of life
history and ecology in understanding cooperation
(Lehmann & Rousset 2010; McNamara & Leimar
2010). As theory develops, it will be important for
empiricists to follow with explicit tests of hypotheses
and models, so that the theory can be further refined.
The ideas presented by the authors of this volumerepresent, in many ways, the revolutionary new
approach to studying behaviour which is currently
underway.We thank all of the authors who participated in this issue, all
of whom enthusiastically embraced our challenge to think
about new directions for the study of cooperation and
generated a series of really stellar ideas. We also thank
Manfred Milinski, as without his introduction this volume
would not have occurred, and numerous peer reviewers,
who further improved the volume. We also thank Claire
Rawlinson at the Philosophical Transactions office for her
assistance in putting this issue together. Funding to S.F.B.
was provided by a National Science Foundation Human
and Social Dynamics Grant (SES 0729244) and an NSF
CAREER Award (SES 0847351), and by the Swiss
Science Foundation to R.B.REFERENCES
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